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Abstract 
 
The inception of the Emission Trading System in Europe (EU-ETS) has made power price more 
expensive. This affects the competitiveness of electricity intensive industrial consumers and may 
force them to leave Europe. Taking up of a proposal of the industrial sector, we explore the 
possible application of special contracts, based on the average cost pricing system, which would 
mitigate the impact of CO2 cost on their electricity price. The model supposes fixed generation 
capacities. A companion paper treats the case with capacity expansion. 
We first consider a reference model representing a perfectly competitive market where all 
consumers (households and industries) are price-takers and buy electricity at the short-run 
marginal cost. We then change the market design assuming that large industrial consumers pay 
power either at a single or at a nodal average cost price. 
The analysis of these problems is conducted with simulation models applied to the Northwestern 
European market. The equilibrium models developed are implemented in the GAMS environment. 
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1 Introduction
Starting from January 2005, Member States of the European Union have in-
troduced the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS hereafter) in order
to curb CO2 emissions and tackle climate change. It is widely admitted today
that the functioning of the EU-ETS should be improved. The degradation of
the competitiveness of part of the European industry is progressively emerg-
ing as one of the possible consequences of the combination of the EU-ETS and
the restructuring of the electricity sector. Electricity intensive industrial users
strongly encourage the review of the ETS to mitigate its negative effects on their
cost balance. This negative impact is twofold: industries need not only to abate
emissions; they have also to pay a higher electricity price. This second effect
results from the practice of the power sector to charge the CO2 costs into elec-
tricity prices. Industrial sectors can adapt to these cost increases by accepting
a reduction of their profits or by increasing their product prices. They explain
that this endangers their competitiveness on international markets. This will
eventually imply a loss of sales and market share, especially for companies ex-
tremely exposed to foreign competition. Some studies (see [2, 9, 11, 13]) show
that the industrial sectors’ exposure to the EU-ETS depends 1) on the indus-
try’s ability to pass the extra carbon cost to consumers, 2) on the international
trade openness, 3) on the energy intensity and the possibility to abate carbon
and, last, 4) on the allowance allocation method1. These factors vary with the
industrial sector considered.
Large industrial consumers argue that this problem may force some of them
to move part of their production activities in extra-Community countries where
emission policies are less restrictive. This entails a serious loss of welfare for
the European countries with an additional environmental damage due to more
lenient norms in non-European countries (carbon leakage2). Large industrial
consumers further claim that power producers exercise market power in order
to maintain high electricity prices, a phenomenon that exacerbates the threat on
competitiveness. A recent move from giant steel company Arcelor Mittal illus-
trates this CO2 problem. The company is refusing to re-open its blast furnace
in Lie`ge (Belgium) if it does not receive the necessary permits free. Lakshmi
Mittal, the CEO of the company, asks Belgian public authorities to provide
the carbon permits needed, otherwise he will move company’s steel production
outside Europe. In an interview given to the Belgian newspaperL’Echo, the
CEO argues we must address the problem globally and not penalize the sector
in Europe. The risk is a relocation of steel production to areas without CO2
constraints. He simply requires good conditions before investing in Europe3.
Under these conditions, industries explicitly ask for either special contracts
whereby they can procure electricity at the average cost or special regulation
that would prevent generators to embed the emission allowance price in the
marginal cost of electricity.
1The allowance allocation method and the amount of allowances distributed affect opera-
tional costs. For instance, grandfathering lessens the cost imposed by the ETS system.
2Carbon leakage strongly depends on plants re-location. It measures the compensation
of an industry’s greenhouse gas reduction by an increase in the same industry’s emissions in
regions without carbon constraint.
3Sources: L’Echo, 5/12/2007. Available at
http://www.lecho.be/article/Mittal sans quotas CO2 je ne relance pas Liege .3434081.
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In this paper, we explore the first of these proposals, i.e. the possible intro-
duction of special contracts based on the average cost pricing system, and we
test to which extend they would heal some of the difficulties of the industry.
We illustrate this issue by the means of small market simulations applied to
a simplified electricity network of the Northwestern Europe (France, Germany,
Belgium and The Netherlands). With the aim of investigating the implica-
tions of the carbon market on electricity prices and demand, we first simulate a
perfectly competitive market where all consumers (households and industries)
are price-takers and are assumed to pay an identical electricity price based on
marginal costs. This represents the reference case. We then model two innova-
tive pricing mechanisms. Assuming that industrial consumers can harness the
financial means to acquire and operate part of base load power plants, we con-
sider an alternative contractual organization whereby they pay the full cost of
those installations and, hence, face average cost based prices. This new pricing
policy is tested in two forms: there is a single average cost price in the first
case; nodal average cost prices are introduced in the second one. Both scenarios
imply segmenting the market and sharing the existing generation capacity be-
tween the two consumer groups in the sense that part of the generation capacity
is fully dedicated to the large industrial consumers.
We find that the impact of average cost based prices on industrial consumers
differs depending on their location and the price arrangement (single or nodal)
applied. Moreover, the technology mix use to produce electricity plays a decisive
role in industrial power prices.
2 Input Data and Assumptions
We conduct the analysis on a stylized representation of the Northwestern Europe
of electricity market, where electricity is provided by eight generators4 and a
fringe, which assembles the remaining small generators.
Generating companies are supposed to produce electricity by operating eight
different technologies5. These are characterized by the existing capacities, the
efficiencies and fuel costs (see Tables 14 and 15 in Appendix B). We use staircase
marginal cost curves to represent the operation of generators. The marginal cost
curves describe the (endogenously determined) merit order, which account emis-
sion factors and fuel costs of each plant. Moreover, we assume some renewable
policy whereby TSO smooths out the variation of “wind” power and transforms
it into a base load band. This policy has obviously a cost that we assume spread
through a feed in tariff that all consumers pay. This type of policy is in place
in some Member States such as Germany. It is introduced here as a proxy for
policies favoring renewables and should obviously be modeled in more detail in
a true case study.
The power system covers 15 nodes located in four countries (see Figure 1).
They are connected by 28 arcs with limited capacity. The grid is modeled by DC
load flow approximation and represented using a Power Transfer Distribution
Factor (PTDF ) matrix provided by ECN (see [4] and Figure 1 for the values).
4E.ON Energie AG, Electrabel SA, Electricite´ de France, ENBWEnergieversorgung Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg, Essent Energie Productie BV, Nuon, RWE Energie AG, Vattenfall Europe AG.
5Hydro (running-of-river plants), “wind”, nuclear, lignite, coal, CCGT, other-gas and oil-
based plants.
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Supply and demand are located at seven nodes: two in Belgium (Merchtem and
Gramme), three in the Netherlands (Krimpen, Maastricht and Zwolle), one in
Germany (“D”) and, finally, one in France (“F”). The remaining German and
French nodes are passive and are only used to transfer electricity. We consider
two periods: winter peak and summer off-peak, measured in hours per year, with
different durations. They are required to be identical in all countries included
in the network. We state that the off-peak lasts seven months (5,136 h) and
the peak the remaining five months (3,624 h). We fully acknowledge that this
is not sufficient to get a good representation of the system. But it is sufficient
to illustrate the phenomenon at work while keeping the model simple.
Figure 1: Northwestern European market and Network line capacities
We distinguish two consumer groups: households (representing small con-
sumers of electricity and tertiary) and large industries with an intensive use of
electricity. Their demand functions are assumed to be linear and differ over
nodes. Moreover, it seems realistic to suppose a constant industrial consump-
tion level over the year while small consumers demand more electricity in winter
than in summer (see Table 13 in Appendix B). As already indicated, we limit
ourselves to seasons assumed to respectively represent the peak and the off-peak
periods. Demand curves are calibrated through a reference point and an elastic-
ity at that point. A wholesale reference price of 40 e/MWh is applied to small
and industrial consumers’ demand functions in both periods. Since our priority
consists in analysing consumers’ reactions to the introduction of the ETS, we
model long-run demand function. Small consumers are expected to behave less
flexible and then we assume that their demand elasticity is -0.1 in the reference
point. Contrarily, we set industrial consumers’ demand elasticity at -1 in order
to account for their ability to leave Europe in case of too high electricity prices6.
We adopt an emission cap E of about 397 Mio ton p.a. We assume that the
permit market is restricted to the power sector and we do not model permit trade
among industries. The justification of this restriction is practical: there is no
information available on the demand for allowance by large industrial consumers.
We shall offer a formal extension of the current model that embeds the whole
set of sectors covered by the EU-ETS. Given this restriction, the emission cap
E corresponds exactly to the sum of the NAPs of the electricity generating
6Since there is almost complete lack of information of demand response of industrial con-
sumers, we took this -1 value from a slide of Newbery.
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companies included in the simulation tests. It defines the amount of emissions
allowed in the power market. A detailed list of the allowance allocations per
country and generating company is reported in Table 16 in Appendix B. Finally,
market simulations are calibrated with data updated to 2005 (see Appendix B).
3 Statement of the Reference Model
The basic models simulate a perfectly competitive market with three main
agents: power companies, consumers (households and industries) and the Trans-
mission System Operator (TSO hereafter). All agents are supposed to be price-
takers and maximize their surpluses.
Power companies profit from selling electricity to both consumer groups.
There is no price discrimination in perfectly competitive markets. Electricity
price are thus identical in both market segments. Their generation activity is
subject to a production balance and a technological constraint. The first ensures
that the quantity of electricity produced is at least equal or greater than the
amount sold. The second accounts for the limited production capacity of power
plants.
Consumers maximize their surplus supposing that the amount of electricity
demand is positive. Recall that, for the sake of realism, we assume that indus-
trial consumption is constant over the year. To this aim, we add a constraint to
the industrial optimization problem, imposing the equality of the hourly con-
sumption of electricity during summer and winter.
The TSO maximizes the merchandising surplus accruing from transmission
operations. As explained above, we include network constraints in PTDF form.
The transmission market is thus a nodal system operating under perfect com-
petition.
Last, we represent the allowance market through an emission balance equa-
tion and introduce a market clearing price for that market. The market clearing
price on the allowance market is thus an output of the model. The perfectly com-
petitive scenario including both the emission and the transmission constraints
is our reference model. In Appendix A.1 we describe the mathematical for-
mulation of this reference model. It is expressed in complementarity condition
form.
4 Results of the Reference Model
In order to assess the long-run impacts of the EU-ETS on industries’ electricity
prices and demand, we compare the results of the reference model with and
without emission constraint.
Our results are certainly in line with industries’ claim: large industrial con-
sumers decrease their electricity consumption by -11% after the inception of the
EU-ETS. This holds in both periods modelled7. This is accompanied by a cut of
almost -23% in their annual surplus. Table 1 shows industrial electricity hourly
demand before and after the introduction of the emission constraint.
7This fall in their electricity consumption is significant, but it is really driven by our
assumptions. The reader should indeed keep in mind that we model industries’ long run
behavior and hence assume a demand elasticity of -1. This model assumption is selected to
fit the threat, exposed by large consumers, of relocating their production capacities.
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MW Without ETS With ETS Relative Changes
Germany 32,214 25,095 -22%
France 25,015 24,910 -0.4%
Merchtem 3,573 3,538 -1%
Gramme 2,029 1,963 -3%
Krimpen 2,722 2,603 -4%
Maastricht 942 889 -6%
Zwolle 1,800 1,615 -10%
Total 68,294 60,613 -11%
Table 1: Industry’s hourly demand without and with EU-ETS
The inception of CO2 restrictive policies also introduces some contrasts in
the inter-temporal electricity prices. They are respectively reported in Tables 2
and 3 and are identical for industries and households.
Transmission costs influence off-peak power prices. In fact, some of the
grid connections are congested. In particular, lines are satured between France
and Germany and between France and Belgium. The interconnection capacity
between the Belgian node Merchtem and the Dutch node Krimpen is congested
and the same happens between Gramme and Maastricht. The direction of the
flows reveals that France exports both to Germany and Belgium, which, in
turn, supplies the Netherlands. Since a great part of the nuclear electricity
generated in France is exported, the congestion of the lines, combined with the
marginal cost pricing implicit in this model, reduces the French power price
to a level close to its marginal operating cost (5.07 e/MWh). This happens
even though the price of the neighboring countries is higher. The congestion
cost makes the difference. In peak, instead, all consumers pay the price set
SUMMER
e/MWh Without ETS With ETS Relative Changes
Germany 21.62 44.94 108%
France 4.50 5.07 13%
Merchtem 36.35 46.91 29%
Gramme 19.09 27.79 46%
Krimpen 36.35 46.91 29%
Maastricht 36.35 46.91 29%
Zwolle 32.15 46.07 43%
Table 2: Off-peak electricity prices of industry and households in e/MWh with-
out and with ETS
at the hub node because the transmission grid is no longer congested. This is
only true in the carbon unconstrained version of the model. In fact, without
carbon restriction, a line connecting France with Belgium is congested in peak
period and, then, the standard economy of nodal transmission system makes
electricity prices different in all nodes. Under the EU-ETS, consumers globally
reduce their electricity demand and the amount of power exported in winter
decreases, avoiding the congestion of the grid. It is then important to recognize
the real nature of the phenomenon. The EU-ETS decreases congestion because
it reduces industrial demand.
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The comparison reported in Table 2 shows that, with the EU-ETS, elec-
tricity prices increase in off-peak. The merit order of the plants can explain
these seemingly strange results. We recall that, in perfect competition and
when there are no transmission constraints, the most expensive plant defines
electricity price at the hub node. With the implementation of the EU-ETS,
generators are encouraged to exploit low emitting technologies, like CCGT, and
reduce the utilization of more polluting ones (notably coal and lignite). In
particular, hydro, “wind” and nuclear capacities are saturated in both periods;
while CCGT plants are fully run in winter. In this case, CCGT technologies,
together with the pass through of the allowance price, set the summer electricity
price at a higher level than coal based plants would have done without the EU-
ETS.
In peak, we observe a reverse behavior: under the emission trading policy,
energy prices become lower. The combination of the change of plant merit
order and the electricity demand cuts explains this outcome. The EU-ETS
obliges generators to modify their fuel mix and to switch lower emitting plants in
order to achieve their emission target. For all these reasons, CCGT power units
determine the winter electricity price (47.36 e/MWh), replacing the natural gas
and oil based installations used in the case with no environmental regulation.
This makes power cheaper than before. The requirement that industrial demand
remains constant throughout explains how demand and price can simultaneously
decrease. This is confirmed by the behavior of small consumers in the peak
period: in presence of emission limitations, they increase by 1% their electricity
consumptions, since prices are a little bit lower in each node. In off-peak,
instead, they lessen their energy utilization (almost -3%) as a consequence of
the raised power prices. Table 3 reports the associated price relative changes.
WINTER
e/MWh Without ETS With ETS Relative Changes
Germany 51.48 47.36 -8%
France 47.48 47.36 -0.3%
Merchtem 57.26 47.36 -17%
Gramme 53.22 47.36 -11%
Krimpen 54.92 47.36 -14%
Maastricht 54.03 47.36 -12%
Zwolle 53.66 47.36 -12%
Table 3: Peak electricity prices of industry and households in e/MWh without
and with ETS
The EU-ETS has thus two effects: first, it adds a carbon component to
summer prices; second, it removes expensive and inefficient units in winter.
These two effects interact with the constant (endogenous) demand level in the
industrial sectors.
Under the EU-ETS restrictions, the allowance price found is 24.44 e/ton.
This positive value signals a tight emission cap. This contradicts the low al-
lowance price that prevailed in the second part of the first compliance period
after global NAPs were commonly judged excessive. Our figures can easily be
confirmed through the common wisdom about the total NAPs in the first com-
pliance period. Reinaud (see [12]) and Smeers (see [18]) explain that CCGT
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and coal plants become competitive when CO2 price reaches a certain “tapping
point”. In particular, Smeers in [18] argues that this shift between CCGT and
coal happens for CO2 price of around 23.65 e/ton. Reinaud in [12] indicates a
CO2 cost of 19 e/ton. Our results are aligned with these studies: only with a
high permit price (like 24.44 e/ton), one forces electricity generating companies
to replace coal technology with less emitting CCGT stations. This is exactly
what we have observed8.
With the application of the environmental policy, carbon emissions globally
reduce by -14% from a level of about 464 Mio ton p.a. to 397 annual Mio
ton. This is exactly the CO2 emission ceiling imposed on the power sector
in the model. Parallel to the global reduction in electricity consumption, one
observes a decreasing emission level in almost all the nodes of the model. There
are two exceptions through: they occur in the Dutch locations Maastricht and
Zwolle. In the first of these two nodes, the global pollution level increases with
respect to the unconstrained carbon case. Power producers, in fact, raise the
operation of their CCGT plants in order to reduce their electricity imports, as
a consequence of the congestion of the line between Maastricth and the Belgian
node Gramme. In Zwolle, instead, the emissions remain constant, since both
the capacity and the fuel mix used to produce energy do not change with respect
to the unconstrained carbon case.
Finally, under these conditions, electricity generating companies’ profit glob-
ally increases by 16% with respect to the unconstrained carbon case. All these
comply with industrial position: there might be a problem of competitiveness
and demand destruction. This justifies to explore their solution proposal.
5 Average Cost Pricing Mechanism
Our results comply with the thesis that the implementation of the EU-ETS
increases electricity prices and induce a corresponding reduction of consumers’
demand, at least in the long run. This effect is not really surprising and results
from basic economic phenomenons. Carbon leakage indeed implies both increase
of emissions and loss of economic activity. The phenomenon serves neither the
EU nor the environment. In order to explore a possible alternative to that
outcome, we modify the basic model and assume that industrial consumers
either pay full average generation cost or directly control part of the generating
capacity installed in the network.
This approach has two implications: the market is segmented into two sub–
markets respectively representing the electricity intensive industries and house-
holds. As a direct consequence, the generation system is also split between
these two market segments. This subdivision is endogenously determined since
8Smeers and Reinaud indicate different CO2 switching price. This because their studies are
based on different input data. Reinaud assumes that coal and gas fuel prices are respectively
1.5 e/GJ and 3.5 e/GJ; while those of Smeers’ study are higher: 2.3 e/GJ (coal) and 3.5
e/GJ (gas). Efficiency rates are identical (0.37 (coal) and 0.49 (gas)) and also gas emission
factor (0.412 ton/MWh). Smeers supposes that coal emits more than Reinaud does (0.99
ton/MWh vs 0.918 ton/MWh). In order to check the consistency of these two studies, we
compute the CO2 switching price using Smeers’ formula and Reinaud’s input data. The
result obtained is 19.24 e/ton that is aligned with Renaiud’s value. Our input data are more
similar to those adopted by Smeers. In particular, we assume that coal costs 2.22 e/GJ with
an emission rate of 0.9542 and efficiency rate of 0.37; while gas price is 4.15 e/GJ with an
emission factor of 0.432 and efficiency rate of 0.49. For more details, see Table 15 and [1].
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the final demand of the large industrial consumers is also endogenously deter-
mined. We shall see that the principle underlying this allocation is to equalize
the marginal value of the capacities allocated to the two segments. This also
implicitly amounts to maximizing the total capacity value. Within this market
segmentation, we assume that small consumers are still priced at the short-run
marginal costs. In contrast, electricity intensive industrial consumers pay elec-
tricity at the average costs corresponding to the full cost of the power plants
reserved for them. We consider two particular applications of this view.
We first represent a case where industrial consumers can purchase electricity
at the same average cost price in any node by the means of a power purchase
consortium. The assumption corresponds to a request of the large consumers to
achieve a single price on the continental “copper plate” through extended coun-
tertrading. Large industrial consumers (and also seemingly the European Con-
sumers) indeed see it desirable, bearing sufficient investment in transmission, to
develop countertrading and to a single electricity price in regional market. In
this scenario, the final electricity price they faced by large industrial consumers
would include both the average production and the average transmission costs,
which consumers generally pay to the TSO.
We also model a second case, where we suppose that industrial consumers
buy only the electricity produced in the node where they are located. This leads
to a nodal average cost based price system. In this way, industrial consumers
are relieved of paying transmission costs, but they are subject to the various
constraints that affect generation at that node. In other words, they are not
free to choose the technology used to supply them. This makes electricity prices
strictly depending on the fuel mix at the node. Subsection 5.1 describes the
results of the average cost models.
The average cost price formulation makes the mathematical problem more
complex because averaging processes destroy the monotonicity properties of the
model. Average cost pricing may also make the problem infeasible. This will
be in particular the case if the fixed charge allocated to the price increases this
latter too much. In order to attempt to mitigate numerical difficulties, we solve
the average cost based models as a sequence of two different sub-problems. For
each average cost price models, we first simulate a market with capacity splitting
and demand segmentation where both consumer segments are priced at the same
short-run marginal costs (the so-called “preliminary problem”). This always has
a solution. This preliminary step amounts to simulating a standard competitive
model. Its solution is employed as starting point for solving the problems with
average cost pricing system.
We then run the average cost pricing models. These problems may not
have a solution9. The surplus maximization problem representing the small
consumers is identical in both the preliminary and the average cost problems;
changes concern only industrial consumers’ equations. For the sake of simplicity,
we do not report the formulation of the preliminary models. The reader should
simply note that these preliminary models are quite similar to the average cost
problems presented in the following sections: one just replaces the average cost
with a marginal cost based price.
9In our specific cases, we can find solution to the single and the nodal average cost pricing
scenarios both with or without the preliminary model. Nevertheless, these two approaches give
different results. As indicated, this is perfectly possible in theory because of non monotonicity;
it also occurs in practice.
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Both average cost pricing mechanisms adopt the same representation of per-
fectly competitive transmission and emission markets as the reference model.
Moreover, the main structure and the constraints of the average cost based
problems are quite similar to the those of the reference case. Power produc-
ers desire to maximize their annual profits under the standard production and
capacity constraints. On the other side, consumers maximize their global sur-
pluses. The complementarity conditions of the single and the nodal average cost
pricing systems are presented respectively in Appendices A.2 and A.3.
5.1 Results of the Average Cost Pricing Models
Our analysis shows that single and nodal average cost based contracts have
different impacts on industries. These depend on their location and the techno-
logical mix used to produce electricity in each node. Tables 4 and 6 report their
values. The single average cost price amounts to 38.10 e/MWh. Fixed costs
contribute for the largest part, followed by the fuel and the emission charges.
Industries tend to congest the network and for this reason they pay transmission
costs to the TSO.
The application of the single average cost pricing system results in a global
increase of +5% of the industrial electricity consumption with respect to the refe-
rence case. This is the desired objective of the policy. However, not all industrial
consumers benefit from the application of this innovative pricing scheme. In
Germany, in the Netherlands and in the Belgian location Merchtem industries
pay electricity at lower prices. Relative changes are between -19% (in Merchtem,
Krimpen and Maastricht) and -17% (in Germany). Instead, in France and in the
Belgian node Gramme the comparison with the marginal cost case shows that
a single average cost price leads to an increase of +69% and +6% respectively.
The direct consequence is that industrial consumers require less electricity. The
decreases of -22% (in France) and -1% (in Gramme) are compensated by the
increase of industrial electricity demand in the other nodes. Table 5 reports
in absolute values industries’ hourly electricity demand under different pricing
scenarios.
Cost Components e/MWh
Fuel 10.64
Transmission 2.74
Emission 7.32
Capacity 17.39
Average cost price 38.10
Table 4: Single average cost price
The endogenous allocation of the installed capacity may offer a plausible
explanation to these results. A great part of the total base-load technologies
(hydro (60%), nuclear (52%) and lignite (62%)) existing in the network is now
reserved for industries. Also 71% of the available “wind” capacity is dedicated
to industrial consumers. Both in France and in Gramme, electricity generating
companies reserve only clean technologies (namely hydro, “wind” and nuclear)
for industries. As expected, France plays an important role in this market seg-
ment, since it covers almost the entire industrial electricity demand that the
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bordering countries are not able to satisfy. In fact, the nuclear capacity that
French generators reserved for the industry is larger than the amount they really
need for their own (industrial) consumers and then anyone can have access to
the exceeding part. This allows meeting the industrial market energy balance.
This has an obvious side effect; this affects the French industries’ competitive
positions, which now have to buy electricity at a higher price. Moreover, be-
cause of the capacity split, French small consumers have a limited access to
nuclear power. This has also a further negative consequence on their electricity
prices, especially in winter, when their energy consumption is higher. In fact,
during the peak period the capacity reserved for French small consumers is not
sufficient to meet their entire demand and therefore they have to import more
expensive electricity. One encounters a similar situation in Gramme, where lo-
cal industries have to share their hydro, “wind” and nuclear plants with foreign
large consumers.
With respect to the reference case, households face higher electricity prices
both in peak and off-peak periods. This is partially due to the endogenous
split in capacity that reserves cheap and base-load technologies to industrial
consumers. In off-peak, CCGT plants set electricity prices after accounting
for the corresponding carbon cost. In peak, instead, natural gas and oil based
installations become again active and determine the prices. Moreover, in this
case, permits are more expensive (+17%) than in the reference scenario. In
fact, power companies have to produce more electricity to fully cover indus-
trial requests. Although small consumers face electricity price increases, their
global demand does not vary too much with respect to the reference case10. The
industrial demand effect prevails over household consumption. This results in
a growth of the amount of electricity produced and, consequently, of the de-
mand for allowances. Since carbon emissions are capped, the allowance price
increases11.
MW Reference case Single Average case Nodal Average case
Germany 25,095 31,065 26,913
France 24,910 19,408 29,002
Merchtem 3,538 4,511 2,176
Gramme 1,963 1,939 2,601
Krimpen 2,603 3,319 2,119
Maastricht 889 1,133 620
Zwolle 1,615 2,033 1,113
Total 60,613 63,408 64,543
Table 5: Comparison of the industrial consumers’ hourly demand under different
pricing scenarios
The application of the nodal average cost based policy has a global positive
effect on industries: they increase their electricity consumption with respect to
both the reference (+6%) and the single average cost price (2%). Looking at the
hourly demand values reported in Table 5, one can easily notice that industrial
consumers assume different positions in relation to the node where they are
10Totally small consumers reduce their demand by -0.4% in off-peak and by -2.8% in peak.
We recall that we assume that they have a small price elasticity.
11With respect to the reference case, allowance price augments by +17%. In fact, it reaches
a cost of 28.48 e/ton starting from a value of 24.44 e/ton.
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located. In France and in the Belgian node Gramme, the nodal average cost
pricing system represents the best policy to heal industrial difficulties. This is
mainly a result of the technological structure in these locations. In a country,
like France, where nuclear is the main power source, nodal average cost pricing
contracts perfectly suit industrial consumers’ needs, since they have wide access
to this cheap and clean technology without sharing it with foreign consumers12.
On the other side, the situation of industries placed in nodes where electricity
is mostly produced by CCGT or coal based technologies is more critical. This
is what happens in the Netherlands and in the Belgian node Merchtem, where
industries are really damaged by this new contractual policy13. In Germany,
instead, the industrial electricity consumption decreases by -13% with respect
to the single average cost case, but it is higher in comparison to the reference
level (+7%).
e/MWh Fuel Emission Capacity Average cost price
Germany 11.59 17.59 14.52 43.70
France 4.50 0.00 12.89 17.39
Merchtem 25.76 22.77 11.25 59.79
Gramme 9.03 1.75 13.01 23.79
Krimpen 25.58 15.56 12.11 53.25
Maastricht 36.35 12.19 8.53 57.06
Zwolle 36.35 12.19 8.53 57.06
Table 6: Nodal average cost price
The contribution of the three components of the nodal average prices (fuel,
emission and fixed costs) shown in Table 6 may explain these results. They de-
pend on the nodal technology mix. For instance, in France, the industrial elec-
tricity price is 17.39 e/MWh, of which 4.50 e/MWh are the average fuel costs
and 12.89 e/MWh are the fixed charges. Electricity producers exploit only nu-
clear plants14 to cover French industrial demand. Nuclear is an environmental-
friendly technology and then French average cost based price does not include
emission burdens. Fuel and capacity charges correspond exactly to the costs of
a nuclear plants, as indicated in Tables 15 and 17 in Appendix B. In Gramme,
industries are mainly supplied by hydro, “wind” and nuclear. Moreover, 31%
and 100% of the available CCGT and natural gas plants are employed, but
these proportions correspond to a few MW of capacity (respectively 373 MW
and 170 MW). Hydro and “wind” reduce the fuel average cost; while emissions
caused by CCGT and natural gas stations add to this cost. Contrarily, industrial
consumers in Merchtem, the other Belgian node, face the highest nodal average
cost price of the market. Electricity generating companies, in fact, use the entire
amount of coal capacity (1,564 MW) and 24% (612 MW) of the CCGT plants
installed in the node to cover their electricity demand. All the clean power
stations (namely hydro, “wind” and nuclear) are dedicated to households. As
indicated in Table 6, this implies high emission costs. Dutch industries in Maas-
tricht and in Zwolle are only supplied by CCGT stations; in Krimpen, instead,
12It is exactly the opposite of what happens in the single average cost pricing scenario.
13Their electricity cuts are as follows: -39% (reference case) and -52% (single average) in
Merchtem, -19% (reference case) and -36% (single average) in Krimpen, -30% (reference case)
and -45% in Maastricht and, finally, - 31% (reference case) and -45% (single average) in Zwolle.
14Precisely 64% of the nuclear capacity installed corresponding to 29,002 MW.
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the set of the technologies given to industries is composed of “wind”, nuclear,
coal and CCGT.
Finally, German industries are mostly supplied by lignite technologies, accom-
panied by nuclear, lignite, hydro and “wind”: this is the reason why emission
charges have the major weight in their prices.
GWh Households Industry Total
Summer Winter Total
Reference case 244 402 646 530 1,176
Single Average case 243 391 634 555 1,189
Nodal Average case 231 392 623 565 1,188
Table 7: Consumers’ annual demand under different pricing scenarios
The comparison of the nodal average cost case with the reference model
shows that the application of this average cost pricing mechanism has a global
negative influence on households. We recall that, in a transmission constraint
free system, small consumers’ prices are determined by the last power station
used to produce electricity augmented by the associated carbon cost. Since,
both in the reference and in the nodal average cost models, CCGT plants are
the margin; differences of electricity prices depend only on carbon cost. In fact,
in the reference case, allowances are cheaper than in the nodal average cost case
(24.44 e/ton vs 28.21 e/ton).
On the other side, the analysis of the two average cases highlights that small
consumers’ demand assumes different trends in relation to the node and the
period considered: apart in Merchtem, they globally reduce their electricity
consumption in off-peak (-4.76%); while in peak only French households lessen
their electricity consumption (-3.3%). These results are still affected both by
the permit price (that in this case is 28.21 e/ton) and the fuel mix.
Billion e Ref. NO EU-ETS Ref. EU-ETS Single A. Nodal A.
Benefit
Industry 13.803 11.201 11.637 13.488
Households 130.869 129.354 124.648 120.202
Consumers 144.672 140.555 136.285 133.690
Generators 25.223 19.534 21.627 25.575
(29.246)a (32.943)a (36.785)a
TSO 0.647 0.902 1.265 0.101
Welfare 170.542 160.991 159.177 159.366
Table 8: Welfare analysis under different pricing scenarios
a Generators’ profits accounting for the value of the carbon permits received for
free.
Table 7 compares consumers’ annual demand under the pricing scenario con-
sidered. The results therein reported confirm the tendency described.
The application of the average cost pricing systems induces a welfare re-
distribution among market players. This is shown in Table 8. Small consumers
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maximize their surplus under a perfectly competitive market. On the other side,
industries benefit a lot from buying electricity at the nodal average cost price.
Their surplus increases by +20% and +16% compared to the reference and
the single average cost case respectively. With the inception of the EU-ETS
and without free allowances, that is if allowances are auctioned, generators’
profits become lower15. This is due the fact that, power companies have now
to account for the additional burdens caused by emissions. This holds in all
cases except for the nodal average cost scenario where power producers increase
their profit by +1% with respect to the model without EU-ETS regulation.
This extra gains come from selling electricity to households. Recall that this
welfare analysis does not include the value of the CO2 permits that electricity
producers would still receive for free. However, in Table 8, we report also
the case when free allowances are included in the computation of generators’
profits. Note that, under this assumption, generators’ benefits are much higher.
These results support the theory of the so–called windfall profits (see [14]).
Finally, the TSO’s merchandising surplus depends on network utilization. For
instance, in the reference case with carbon restriction, the TSO only makes
profit in summer, when the network is congested. In contrast, the construction
of the nodal average cost case implies that the TSO only receives payments from
households. Moreover, these payments are very low with respect to the other
cases because only one line, connecting Germany to France, is congested and
this occurs only in winter. One can note that one falls back on the standard
result of economic theory that perfect competition maximizes global welfare.
6 Sensitivity and Robustness Analysis
In this Section, we conduct a sensitivity analysis in order to check how industrial
consumers’ demand and emissions vary when one modifies the assumptions reg-
ulating the permit market. In our models, we endogenously determine carbon
price and explore its modification under different electricity pricing mechanisms.
We now simplify our models by directly introducing an exogenous permit price.
We test two cases when:
1. Permit price is set at 10 e/ton (hereafter “EU-ETS PP 10” case)
2. Permit price is set at 20 e/ton (hereafter “EU-ETS PP 20” case)
and we compare the results with those of the original version of our models. This
test requires a small modification of the model. An exogenous allowance price
dispenses with the need to explicitly model the market of allowances. This
implies that there is no need to retain the emission constraint in the model.
Power companies buy and sell permits on the market at exogenously given
prices. In contrast with we have done before, we first define a permit price and
then we compute the amount of emissions generated. Note that the endogenous
permit prices found in the previous sections are higher than those tested here.
Obviously, the lower carbon charges are and the higher CO2 emitted will be.
15The comparison among the perfect competition model without carbon constraint and the
other scenarios results in the following profit cuts: -23% (reference case with EU-ETS) and
-14% (single average cost case).
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Recall that the reference model without emission restrictions, industries glo-
bally consume 68,294 MW of electricity per hour. This amount decreases and
falls to 60,613 MW when we set a cap of 397 ton p.a. The endogenous value of
the associated permit price is 24.44 e/ton. Instead, when we fix a price of 10
e/ton, industrial consumption increases by +4% with respect to the reference
case with EU-ETS regulation, because electricity becomes cheaper16. Also small
consumers’ demand raises.
As indicated in Table 9, annual emissions are about 419 Mio ton (+6% with
respect to the reference case). This is due to the fact that electricity generating
companies exploit more lignite/coal and CCGT plants in order to cover the
increased wholesale demand. With such a low permit price, lignite/coal stations
remain more competitive than CCGT stations. A similar reasoning holds when
we apply a permit price of 20 e/ton. Industries demand 61,946 MW of electricity
each hour. In this case, the increase with respect to reference endogenous case
is 3%, lower than in the “EU-ETS PP 10” scenario. Imposing a permit price of
20 e/ton makes electricity more expensive. Under this assumptions, the global
amount of CO2 emitted is 407 Mio ton (see Table 9).
A similar reasoning can be applied to the sensitivity analysis conducted on
the single average cost pricing models. Fixing the permit price at 10 e/ton en-
tails a huge increase (+10%) of the industrial consumers’ electricity consump-
tion. In fact, starting from a hourly consumption of 63,408 MW, when the
carbon price is endogenous, industries now demand 69,723 MW. This depends
on the fact that the single average cost price is set at 33.92 e/MWh, that is, 11%
less than the single average cost price of the original model (38.10 e/MWh).
Imposing a permit price of 20 e/ton has still a positive impact on industries,
even if the raise in their global electricity consumption is only +3%. We recall
that in the original version of this model, CO2 permits cost 28.48 e/ton. The
more lenient emission prices in combination with increased electricity demand
explain why emission levels now reach the high level of 464 Mio ton and 441
Mio ton respectively in the “EU-ETS PP 10” and “EU-ETS PP 20” scenarios
(see Table 9). Note that 464 Mio ton corresponds exactly to the pollution level
without any environmental regulation.
The application of a mild environmental policy, like “EU-ETS PP 10” also
induces industries to consume a lot of power in the nodal average cost model.
The consumption increase with respect to the original version of the model
is about 11% (71,840 MW). In the “EU-ETS PP 20”, the global electricity
consumption only increases by +3% (66,619 MW). Again, this implies higher
CO2 emissions as indicated in Table 9. In particular, when the permit price is
fixed at 10 e/ton, global emissions amount to 471 Mio ton, that is even higher
than the total carbon emitted in absence of an environmental regulation. This
suggests that the Regulator should impose a restrictive cap to emissions in order
to achieve the EU-ETS goal and make clean technologies more competitive.
We further check the robustness of our results by analysing the case when
industrial consumers’ demand is less elastic. Starting from the same reference
demand point (see Section 2), we set the elasticity at that point at -0.8 instead of
-1. This obviously modifies the results (for all agents included in the models),
but keeps consumption and price trends almost identical. Tables 10 reports
annual consumers’ demand. As in Table 7, industries increase their electricity
16This is due the fact that the CO2 contribution to the power price is reduced.
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Mio ton PP endogenous PP 10 PP 20
Reference case before EU-ETS 464
Reference case after EU-ETS 397 419 407
Single Average case 397 464 441
Nodal Average case 397 471 423
Table 9: Emission level under different pricing scenarios
consumption in the average cost pricing system. Again, the increment is higher
with nodal average cost based contracts. Small consumers, instead, suffer from
pricing discrimination and reduce their power demand. Nevertheless, this new
industrial elasticity assumption modifies some results of the nodal average cost
model.
GWh Households Industry Total
Summer Winter Total
Reference case 243.3 402 645.3 524 1,169
Single Average case 242.7 391 633.7 554 1,188
Nodal Average case 239.9 396 635.9 556 1,192
Table 10: Consumers’ annual demand under different pricing scenarios. Indus-
trial elasticity 0.8.
Billion e Ref. NO EU-ETS Ref. EU-ETS Single A. Nodal A.
Benefit
Industry 16.456 13.455 14.466 15.334
Households 131.009 129.052 124.650 125.294
Consumers 147.465 142.507 139.116 140.628
Generators 24.992 19.381 21.457 21.162
(29.791)a (32.770)a (32.463)a
TSO 0.654 0.942 1.264 0.779
Welfare 173.111 162.830 161.837 162.569
Table 11: Welfare analysis under different pricing scenarios. Industrial elasticity
-0.8.
a Generators’ profits accounting for the value of the carbon permits received for
free.
In particular, households’ electricity demand is higher than in the single
average cost pricing case. In the original version of the model (industrial elas-
ticity set at -1), one faces the reverse situation. The comparison among the
results reported in Tables 10 and 7 shows that industrial electricity demand is
reduced. Consequently, they need less capacity that now becomes available for
small consumers. Households therefore increase their electricity consumption
in both periods. This raises network congestion and allows TSO to increase
its merchandising surplus as indicated in Table 11, where we report the results
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of the welfare analysis conducted under the industrial elasticity assumption of
-0.8.
7 Conclusion
The special contracts tested in this paper represent one response proposal of Eu-
ropean industrial consumers to the new environment created by the EU-ETS. It
implies changing the pricing system to mitigate the increase of electricity prices
caused by the EU-ETS. We test two different average cost pricing policies (sin-
gle and nodal ones) that have different effects on industries.
A common point, discussed in Section 5, is that average cost based pricing en-
courages industries to maintain their activities (here represented by consump-
tion of electricity) with respect to the reference level at least under the condition
retained in this model (exogenous capacities and efficient transmission market).
However, neither the single nor the nodal average cost pricing mechanisms com-
pletely mitigate the burdens imposed by the EU-ETS on the industrial sector.
The first policy negatively affects French and part of the Belgian electricity in-
tensive users, who, instead, profit of the second average strategy. In Germany,
in Merchtem and in all Dutch nodes, industries face the opposite situation.
The conclusion is that the impact of these special contracts on electricity inten-
sive consumers depends on the particular pricing scheme implemented (single
or nodal) and on the fuel mix adopted to produce electricity in the countries
where industries operate. This is obviously the key factor, which defines power
average cost based prices.
Finally, the high emission allowance price reveals the stress that the genera-
tion system is currently subject to. This suggests that investments in renewable
power technologies, the improvement of the efficiency of the existing electricity
units and the replacing of old power units are very needed. But looking at this
problem requires capacity expansion model.
References
[1] K. Davis and URS Corporation, Greenhouse Gas Emission Factor Review,
Edison Mission Energy, 2003.
[2] D. Demailly and P. Quirion, CO2 abatement, competitiveness and leakage
in the European cement industry under the EU-ETS: grandfathering versus
output-based allocation, Climate Policy, 6(2006), pp. 93-113.
[3] S.P. Dirkse and M.C. Ferris, The PATH solver: a nonmomotone stabiliza-
tion scheme for mixed complementarity problems, Optm. Methods Soft-
ware, 5(1995), pp. 123-156.
[4] ECN, Evaluation of models for market power in electricity
networks Test data, Retrieved December 2003. Available at
http : //www.ecn.nl/en/ps/products − services/models − and −
instruments/competes/model − evaluation/.
17
[5] European Commission, National Reports on Verified Emission and Surren-
dered Allowances, Retrieved April 2006. Available at
http : //ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/reviewen.htm.
[6] Eurostat, Consumption of electricity by industry, transport activities and
households/services, Retrieved June 2006.
Available at http : //epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
[7] F. Facchinei and J. S. Pang, Finite-Dimensional Variational Inequalities
and Complementarity Problems, Springer, Volume I, 2002.
[8] IEA, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity. International Energy
Agency, 2005.
[9] McKinsey and Ecofys, EU ETS Review, Report on International Competi-
tiveness, European Commission, DG Environment, 2006.
[10] A. Nagurney, Network Economics, A Variational Inequalities Approach,
Klumer Academic Publishers, 1993.
[11] U. Oberndorfer and K. Reggings, The Impacts of the European Union Emis-
sions Trading Scheme on the Competitiveness in Europe, Discussion Paper
No. 06-051, ZEW Centre for European Economic Research, 2006.
[12] J. Reinaud, Emission Trading and Its Possible Impacts on Investment De-
cisions in the Power Sector, IEA Information Paper, 2003.
[13] ———, Industrial Competitiveness under the European Union Emission
Trading Scheme, IEA Information Paper, 2005.
[14] J.P.M. Sijm, K. Neuhoff and Y. Chen, Cost Pass Thought and Windfall
Profits in the Power Sector, Climate Policy 5 (2006), pp. 61-78.
[18] Y. Smeers, Assessment of EU CO2 Regulation, Ifri Energy Roundtable,
January 30, 2007.
[15] UCTE, National electricity consumption 2005 and peak load, Retrieved May
2006. Available at
http : //www.ucte.org/services/onlinedatabase/consumption/.
[16] UCTE, Monthly Consumption of a specific country for a specific range of
time, Retrieved May 2006. Available at
http : //www.ucte.org/services/onlinedatabase/consumption/.
Appendix A. Complementarity Problem
The models used in this study are all formulated as complementarity problems.
First, we briefly present the mathematical formulation of the complementarity
problems (CPs) and, then, we describe the models implemented (see [7, 10] for
a presentation of complementarity problems). From a mathematical point of
view, CPs are defined as follows:
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Definition 1 Let Rn+ denote the nonnegative orthant in R
n. Given a mapping
F : Rn+ → Rn, the MCP is to find a vector x∗ ∈ Rn such that:
0 ≤ x∗⊥F (x∗) ≥ 0 (1)
The use of the term “complementarity” to indicate these conditions derives
directly from the concept of orthogonality (⊥) stated by definition. In other
words, solving a MCP consists in finding x∗ ≥ 0 such that:
F (x∗) ≥ 0 and F (x∗)x∗ = 0 (2)
Condition (1) is the compact form we adopt for the CPs formulation of
our models. These CP problems are implemented in the GAMS modelling
environment adopting PATH as solver (see [3]).
Complementarity-based models offer a natural approach to construct equilib-
rium model. A market comprises different agents that produce, trade and con-
sume different commodities. Standard microeconomic theory suggests to repre-
sent each agent by an optimization problem (profit or surplus maximization).
Complementarity models readily derive from this principle. Complementarity-
based formulations are created by first writing the first-order conditions (KKTs)
of the maximization problems of the agents included in the models studied17
and, then, adding market equilibrium conditions18. The CPs system obtained
should be square: one should have as many variables as complementarity con-
ditions. It implies a correspondence one to one between variables and comple-
mentarity conditions.
Appendix A.1. Reference case with emission and transmis-
sion constraints
The reference model describes a perfectly competitive energy market comple-
mented by equally perfectly competitive nodal transmission and allowance mar-
kets. There is no market discrimination in perfect competition and then house-
holds and industries pay identical electricity prices. These are determined by
the short–run marginal cost of the last running plant. The construction of the
model is based on the following principle.
Electricity generating companies maximize their profits accounting for the
production balance and the technological constraint. The complementarity ver-
sion of their model is stated by equilibrium conditions (3-6) and can be inter-
preted as follows. Let pti be the electricity price at node i and period t and
ηtf,i the short–run marginal production costs faced by power firm f in node i
and period t. Condition (3) defines the equality between these two variables for
positive level of electricity gtf,i sold by firm f in node i in period t. Let λ be
the allowance price and νtf,i,m the scarcity rent of a plant running at maximal
capacity. As indicated in (4), ηtf,i accounts for the plant fuel costs costf,i,m, the
emission opportunity cost emm · λ and the νtf,i,m scarcity rent. Note that emm
indicates the emission factor of technology m and the permit price λ is paired
to the emission constraint (15) to express the market clearing of allowances.
17In our case, electricity generating companies and consumers.
18Emission and transmission constraints and equilibrium on energy, emission and transmis-
sion markets.
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Firm f produces gptf,i,m using technology m at node i in period t. The variable
ηtf,i is also matched with condition (6), which establishes the balance between
the quantity of electricity produced gptf,i,m and sold g
t
f,i. Finally, (5) indicates
that scarcity rent νtf,i,m is positive when plants m are run at their full capacity
Gf,i,m.
0 ≤ −pti + ηtf,i⊥ gtf,i ≥ 0 (3)
0 ≤ costf,i,m + emm · λ+ νtf,i,m − ηtf,i⊥gptf,i,m ≥ 0 (4)
0 ≤ Gf,i,m − gptf,i,m⊥ νtf,i,m ≥ 0 (5)
0 ≤
∑
m
gptf,i,m − gtf,i⊥ ηtf,i ≥ 0 (6)
Households and industries maximize their surplus. Conditions (7), (8) and
(10) state that prices pti should be lower than the marginal willingness to pay for
the first power unit if the quantities consumed (ds,1i , d
w,1
i and d
t,2
i ) are positive.
The electricity consumption of households is dt,2i . It differs per node i and
period t. Industrial electricity consumption is, instead, constant over time. In
order to model this assumption, we first split electricity demand and the related
electricity prices in sub-variables (respectively ds,1i , d
w,1
i and p
s
i , p
w
i ) accounting
explicitly for the two periods presented in the model. We then add (9) to
impose the equality between hourly summer (s) and winter (w) consumption.
This condition is matched with the dual variable αi, which affects consumers’
electricity prices as indicated in conditions (7) and (8). Electricity prices pti are
identical among consumer segments in perfect competition.
0 ≤ psi − αi − as,1i + bs,1i · ds,1i · ⊥ ds,1i ≥ 0 (7)
0 ≤ pwi + αi − aw,1i + bw,1i · dw,1i · ⊥ dw,1i ≥ 0 (8)
0 ≤ ds,1i − dw,1i ⊥ αi ≥ 0 (9)
0 ≤ pti − at,2i + bt,2i · dt,2i · ⊥ dt,2i ≥ 0 (10)
Electricity is a special commodity since it is not storable. Real-time equality
of electricity production and consumption is necessary for the well-functioning
of physical system. This implies that generation flows need to be balanced each
hour. This balance is expressed by equality (11). The associated hub price
phubt is supposed to assume positive values.
0 ≤
∑
f,i
gtf,i −
∑
i
dt,1i −
∑
i
dt,2i ⊥ phubt ≥ 0 (11)
phubt represents the market clearing price set at the hub node19 in each
period t and it is used to compute nodal electricity prices as shown in condition
(12). Following nodal pricing theory, nodal electricity prices pti are given by the
price at the phubt plus the congestion charges (
∑
m(−µt,+l + µt,−l ) · PTDFl,i)
that consumers pay to the TSO. The regulation of the system implies that
the generator receives and the consumer pays nodal prices. The result is that
consumers situated in the hub node only pay the hub price and do not face the
19The hub node is supposed to be a virtual market where all electricity asks and bids
converge and match.
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network costs. Last but not the least, the dual µtl = −µt,+l + µt,−l can assume a
positive or a negative sign, depending on the direction of the flow that congests
the line. Nodal prices are then written as:
0 ≤ pti − phubt −
∑
m
(−µt,+l + µt,−l ) · PTDFl,i⊥ phubt ≥ 0 (12)
Transmission costs affect electricity price making them different over nodes
as soon as one line is congested in the system. Conditions (13) and (14) describe
the transmission constraints in accordance with the DC load flow approxima-
tion. To this aim we use the Power Transfer Distribution Factor (PTDF ) ma-
trix, which determines both the patterns and the proportions of power flowing
through network lines. PTDFl,i is the flow through line l resulting from a unit
injection in node i and withdrawal at the hub (assuming no losses). A basic
security constraint is that the flows in the lines do not exceed their capacities.
This is expressed as follows. The sum over all nodes i of the proportion of
the net power flow (
∑
f g
t
f,i − dt,1i − dt,2i ) injected from all nodes i and passing
through line l to reach the hub minus the sum over all nodes i of the proportion
of the net power flows injected from the hub and withdrawn from node i must be
lower than the capacity of the line Linecapl used to transfer electricity20. This
must hold for any load pattern. We must therefore introduce two transmission
constraints to account for the double direction that power flows can follow.
0 ≤ Linecapl − (
∑
i
PTDFl,i · (
∑
f
gtf,i − dt,1i − dt,2i )) ⊥ µt,+l ≥ 0 (13)
0 ≤ Linecapl + (
∑
i
PTDFl,i · (
∑
f
gtf,i − dt,1i − dt,2i )) ⊥ µt,−l ≥ 0 (14)
Relation (13) and (14) together with (12) express the market clearing conditions
of a perfectly competitive transmission market organized according to the nodal
paradigm.
The emission constraint (15) expresses that the total amount of emission
produced over the year (hourly generation gtf,i,m time the hour in each period
hourti and the emission factor emm per technologym) can not exceed the annual
emission cap E. The value of the permit price λ is positive when the total
amount of emissions generated equals the cap E. This means that the emission
policy is binding. This opportunity cost influences electricity prices and firms’
market optimality conditions (see 4). We recall that, in order to simplify the
presentation, we model a closed allowance market restricted to the power sector.
This implies that the emission cap E is exactly equal to the sum of the allowances
that electricity generating companies have so far received for free.
0 ≤ E −
∑
t,f,i,m
gtf,i,m · emm · hourti ⊥ λ ≥ 0 (15)
20We do not model here the so–called “n-1 reliability criterion”. It ensures that in case a
line is cut off, the remaining available lines can bear the redistributed flows without damaging
the system security.
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Appendix A.2. Single average cost pricing model
In the single average cost pricing scenario, we assume that industries constitute a
power purchase consortium that buys electricity from plants located in different
nodes of the network, using special contracts. In this way, they face an identical
price independently of their location. This model requires to introduce a mar-
ket segmentation to correspond to the two different pricing schemes: marginal
cost pricing for households and small industrial consumers (hereafter house-
holds), average cost pricing for large industrial consumers (hereafter industry).
The apexes “1” and “2” are adopted to indicate respectively large industries
and households’ variables. Moreover, since industrial electricity consumption is
constant, we assume that variables do not depend on time t. Because house-
holds consume more electricity in winter than in summer, we maintain the time
dependence in their variables.
0 ≤ ηt,2f,i − pt,2i ⊥ gt,2f,i ≥ 0 (16)
0 ≤ η1f,i − β1 − (
∑
t,l
(−µt,+l + µt,−l ) · proportiont · PTDFl,i)⊥ g1f,i ≥ 0 (17)
Like in the reference model of Appendix A.1, power companies maximize their
profits under generation and capacity constraints. The interpretation of con-
ditions (16), (17), (18), (19), (20) and (21) is identical to those presented in
Appendix A.1. Specifically, it implies that the operations of the part of the
generation system allocated to industrial demand is efficient: it minimizes total
costs among plants, taking into account transmission charges (the µt,±l that have
to be paid). In this interpretation β1 is the marginal cost (at the hub) of elec-
tricity generated by the capacities dedicated to the industries. By construction,
power companies differentiate their production activities between households
and industry. This requires to duplicate the representation of the power sector.
Moreover, generators have to decide how to share the installed capacity between
small and large consumers. Variables ηt,2f,i and η
1
f,i are the marginal production
cost faced by power companies to supply respectively households and industries;
while gt,2f,i, g
1
f,i and gp
t,2
f,i,m, gp
1
f,i,m define respectively the amount of electricity
sold to and produced for small and industrial consumers.
0 ≤ costf,i,m + λ · emm + νt,2f,i,m − ηt,2f,i⊥ gpt,2f,i,m ≥ 0 (18)
0 ≤ costf,i,m + λ · emm + ν1f,i,m − η1f,i⊥ gp1f,i,m ≥ 0 (19)
0 ≤
∑
m
gpt,2f,i,m − gt,2f,i⊥ ηt,2f,i ≥ 0 (20)
0 ≤
∑
m
gp1f,i,m − g1f,i⊥ η1f,i ≥ 0 (21)
The split of capacity is endogenously determined by constraints (22) and (23).
Variables G2f,i,m and G
1
f,i,m indicate the plant capacities respectively dedicated
to households and industries. Condition (24) states that the sum of the MW
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capacity reserved for households and industries should not exceed the total
power capacity (Gf,i,m) installed in the market.
0 ≤ G2f,i,m − gpt,2f,i,m⊥ νt,2f,i,m ≥ 0 (22)
0 ≤ G1f,i,m − gp1f,i,m⊥ ν1f,i,m ≥ 0 (23)
0 ≤ Gf,i,m −G1f,i,m −G2f,i,m⊥ γf,i,m ≥ 0 (24)
That constraint is matched with the variable γf,i,m representing the global
scarcity rent. The variable γf,i,m together with the variables ν
t,2
f,i,m and ν
1
f,i,m
appearing in (25) and (26) ensure the effectiveness of the split in capacity be-
tween the two consumer sectors. Note first that the parameter proportiont in
(25) determines the proportions of the duration of each period t. Looking at
conditions (25) and (26), one then notices that γf,i,m implicitly defines an equal-
ity between νt,2f,i,m and ν
1
f,i,m. (25) and (26) therefore imply that the marginal
value of capacity are identical for households and industrial consumers, even
if their electricity prices are determined using two different approaches. This
implies that the allocation of the capacity maximizes its total value.
0 ≤ γf,i,m −
∑
t
νt,2f,i,m · proportiont⊥ G2f,i,m ≥ 0 (25)
0 ≤ γf,i,m − ν1f,i,m⊥ G1f,i,m ≥ 0 (26)
The efficiency of the capacity allocation can also be observed on the variable
β1 that is meant to represent the hypothetical marginal cost price that indus-
tries should pay, at the hub, under a perfectly competitive regime. Empirical
results show that its value (54.10 e/MWh) corresponds exactly to the aver-
age of the phubt,2 on the households’ market weighted by period duration. It is
worthwhile to explain that the industrial consumers’ problem effectively embeds
two different pricing structures. One is real in the sense that it corresponds to
the commercial transactions (what the industry pay to the generators and the
TSO). The other is virtual in the sense of transfer price. It is there just to
insure efficient internal operations of the capacities dedicated to the industry.
An average cost price p1 (see (35)), including the average production and trans-
mission costs is what is effectively paid for electricity trading. In contrast, the
marginal cost price β1 that pairs the electricity balance of the industrial sector
plays the role of an internal transfer price. The similarity can be seen by first
observing the relations. This dual price β1 appears also in condition (17) and
(plus the transmission charges) assume the role of pt,2i for households.
0 ≤
∑
f,i
gt,2f,i −
∑
i
dt,2i ⊥ phubt,2 ≥ 0 (27)
0 ≤
∑
f,i
g1f,i −
∑
i
d1i⊥ β1 ≥ 0 (28)
(27) expresses the market clearing at the hub of electricity delivered to house-
holds. This condition implies the hub price phubt,2, which is used to compute
their marginal electricity prices pt,2i (see condition (30)) as already explained in
the reference model. (28) expresses a similar virtual market clearing price for
the electricity delivered to the industry.
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0 ≤ pt,2i − at,2i + bt,2i · dt,2i ⊥ dt,2i ≥ 0 (29)
0 ≤ pt,2i − phubt,2 − (
∑
l
(−µt,+l + µt,−l ) · PTDFl,i)⊥ pt,2i ≥ 0 (30)
0 ≤ p1 − a1i + b1i · d1i⊥ d1i ≥ 0 (31)
Conditions (29) and (31) express the inverse electricity demand functions of the
two consumer sectors. Note that industries in (31) globally face the average
price p1, but they pay pprod1 to power companies and ptrans1 to the TSO.
Equations (32) and (33) illustrate the formulation of these two components of
the single average cost price. The average production cost accounts for the
total variable (costf,i,m (fuel) and emm · λ (emission)) costs and the annual
fixed charges FCf,i,m related to capacity G1f,i,m they have under their direct
control. The value 8760 is the number of hours in one year.
0 ≤ pprod1 − (
∑
f,i,m(gp
1
f,i,m · (costf,i,m + emm · λ) · 8760))∑
i d
1
i · 8760
+ (32)
−
∑
f,i,m FCf,i,m ·G1f,i,m∑
i d
1
i · 8760
⊥ pprod1 ≥ 0
The average transmission costs accounts for the congestion burdens caused by
flows inji exchanged among industries.
0 ≤ ptrans1+ (33)
− (
∑
l,i PTDFl,i · inji · 8760 ·
∑
t(µ
t,+
l − µt,−l ) · proportiont)∑
i d
1
i · 8760
⊥ ptrans1 ≥ 0
0 ≤ inji − (
∑
f
g1f,i − d1i )⊥ inji ≥ 0 (34)
0 ≤ p1 − pprod1 − ptrans1⊥ p1 ≥ 0 (35)
Finally, the transmission (36) and (37) and the emission (38) constraints slightly
change with respect to reference case in the sense that injection and generation
variables are disaggregated into households and industries’ components. This
is a direct implication of the market segmentation introduced to accommodate
the two pricing regimes. However, the structure of these relations remains un-
changed.
0 ≤ Linecapl − (
∑
i
PTDFl,i · (
∑
f
g1f,i +
∑
f
gt,2f,i − d1i − dt,2i ))⊥ µt,+l ≥ 0 (36)
0 ≤ Linecapl + (
∑
i
PTDFl,i · (
∑
f
g1f,i +
∑
f
gt,2f,i − d1i − dt,2i ))⊥ µt,−l ≥ 0 (37)
0 ≤ E − (
∑
f,i,m
emm · gp1f,i,m · 8760 +
∑
t,f,i,m
emm · gpt,2f,i,m · hourt)⊥ λ ≥ 0 (38)
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Appendix A.3. Nodal average cost pricing
We extend the single average cost pricing approach to the case when industrial
consumers can conclude special contracts with local producers. In this way, we
get a new price formation reflecting nodal average costs. This implies different
average cost prices (see condition (39)), depending on the technology employed
to generate power at each node. Transmission costs are no longer embedded in
the nodal average prices, since there is a direct local connection between indus-
tries and generating companies. We assume, in fact, that industrial consumers
are supplied only with electricity produced by local power plants dedicated to
them. In other words, there is no need to import electricity in order to satisfy the
internal industrial demand. Nevertheless, industries remain subject to the var-
ious local constraints, which unavoidably affects their electricity prices. Nodal
average cost prices p1i vary over nodes i and account for the fuel (costf,i,m), the
emission (emm ·λ) and the capacity charges (FCf,i,m) associated with the plants
m that power firm f dedicates to industries in node i. Globally the capacity
reserved for industrial consumers is G1f,i,m. This leads to the expression:
0 ≤ p1i −
(
∑
f,m(gp
1
f,i,m · (costf,i,m + emm · λ) · 8760))
d1i · 8760
+ (39)
−
∑
f,m FCf,i,m ·G1f,i,m
d1i · 8760
⊥ p1i ≥ 0
All the other assumptions (notably market segmentation and capacity split-
ting) and the corresponding constraints still hold. Furthermore, the households’
optimization problem does not change. For these reasons, we consider only the
complementarity conditions that are subject to modifications. Since the indus-
trial market is local, in each node there is an industrial energy balance as shown
by condition (40). As a consequence, the dual variable β1i depends on node i.
0 ≤
∑
f
g1f,i − d1i⊥ β1i ≥ 0 (40)
As in the single average cost pricing model, β1i is the virtual price (equal to
the local marginal cost) that industries would have to pay in a perfectly com-
petitive market if demand were the one generated by pt,2i , the small consumers’
prices.
e/MWh pt,2i β
1
i
Germany 50.63 50.63
France 54.01 54.01
Merchtem 52.43 52.43
Gramme 52.59 52.59
Krimpen 51.99 51.99
Maastricth 51.94 51.94
Zwolle 51.63 51.63
Table 12: Comparison between pt,2i (weighted average) and β
t,1
i
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In other words, β1i is an internal transfer price which effectively ensures the
right allocation of the market sources between households and industries. Our
empirical tests show that β1i and the weighted (by period duration) average
values of pt,2i are identical (see Table 12). This equality between the virtual
transfer price and the one paid by the households confirms the efficiency of
the allocation of capacity between the two sectors. At each node, the two
market segments pay the same price: this means that the marginal welfare
in the two segments are equal at each node. The price β1i appears also in (42)
which states the equality between marginal electricity price and cost for positive
generation level g1f,i. Condition (41) is the new demand function of industrial
consumers. Finally, transmission constraints are slightly different from (36) and
(37) presented in Appendix A.2. By construction, network congestion is here
only caused by power flows exchanged among households. For this reason, the
injection flows in conditions (43) and (44) are computed accounting only for the
electricity produced for and demanded by small consumers.
0 ≤ p1i − a1i + b1i · d1i⊥ d1i ≥ 0 (41)
0 ≤ η1f,i − β1i⊥ g1f,i ≥ 0 (42)
0 ≤ Linecapl − (
∑
i
PTDFl,i · (
∑
f
gt,2f,i − dt,2i ))⊥ µt,+l ≥ 0 (43)
0 ≤ Linecapl + (
∑
i
PTDFl,i · (
∑
f
gt,2f,i − dt,2i ))⊥ µt,−l ≥ 0 (44)
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Appendix B. Input Data
Table 13 introduces the reference demand values per period and consumer group.
Our computations are based on public data make available on Eurostat (see [5])
and UTCE websites (see [15, 16]).
Nodes Off-peak Peak
Reference Demand Industry Households Industry Households
Germany 38,400 14,660 38,400 43,230
France 26,530 25,410 26,530 53,380
Merchtem (BE) 4,770 1,310 4,770 4,580
Gramme (BE) 2,050 560 2,050 1,960
Krimpen (NL) 4,300 2,560 4,300 6,240
Maastricht (NL) 950 570 950 1,390
Zwolle (NL) 1,570 930 1,570 2,280
Table 13: Hourly reference demand in MW
Each generating company considered in our models has its own technology struc-
ture as indicated in Table 14.
Available Capacity
Technology Germany France Merchtem Gramme Krimpen Maastricht Zwolle
Hydro 1,505 6,804 0 13 0 0 0
Wind 4,583 1 20.43 21.32 101.26 101.26 102
Nuclear 15,007 45,369 2,078 2,204 337 0 0
Lignite 17,783 77 0 0 0 0 0
Coal 24,613 8,824 1,564 979 3,128 0 482
CCGT 13,544 8,164 2,589 1,207 4,432 2,917 4,834
Other-Gas 2,147 256 194 170 833 0 0
Oil-based 0 4,760 55 194 0 0 0
total 79,183 73,535 6,500 4,788 8,831 3,018 5,417
Table 14: MW of available capacity by nodes
Technology Emission Factor Marginal cost Availability
Hydro 0 0.00 different
Wind 0 0.00 25%
Nuclear 0 4.50 75%
Lignite 0.97 14.86 85%
Coal 0.9542 21.62 80%
CCGT 0.432 36.35-37.08 85%
Other-Gas 0.6266 54.92-55.20 85%
Oil-based 0.8441 46.9-67.62 85%
Table 15: Emission factors (ton/MWh), Marginal costs (e/MWh) and Avail-
ability factors per technology
The hydro factors adopted in the model are based on own computations and they
are as follows: 32.4% (Germany), 28.9% (France), 12.3% (Belgium) and 0% (The
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Netherlands). We used public data available on Eurostat [6] and UTCE [15]
websites. The starting values of the installed capacity are based on information
published on the annual reports (2005) of the generating companies included in
the simulations. Table 15 reports all the emission rates (see also [1] for more
details). The marginal fuel costs are computed taking into account the efficiency
factor of each technology. They are based on public data21. In particular, we
set the efficiency rates of lignite/coal and CCGT plants respectively at 37%
and 49% as in [18]. Table 16 lists the amount of emission allowances that each
electricity generating companies holds. Those define their emissions cap. As
reference, we took public figures available on the European Commission website
(see [5]).
Ton p.a. Germany France Belgium Netherlands Per Company
EoN 35,798,149 7,698,528 43,496,677
Electrabel 351,107 9,296,495 7,749,596 17,397,198
Edf 23,540,828 23,540,828
EnBW 10,302,328 10,302,328
Essent 9,909,033 9,909,033
Nuon 9,109,160 9,109,160
RWE 112,482,413 112,482,413
Vattenfall 77,003,200 77,003,200
Fringe 72,384,875 11,709,252 5,764,115 4,283,146 94,141,388
tot 308,322,072 35,250,080 15,060,610 38,749,463 397,382,225
Table 16: NAPs per generating companies and country
Finally, Tables 17 shows the hourly fixed costs included in the average cost
pricing models. They are classified by node and technology. In accordance with
our input data (see [8]), “wind” technologies are more expensive in the Nether-
lands than in the other countries, where power companies receive subsidies to
build “wind” plants.
e/MWh Germany France Merchtem Gramme Krimpen Maastricht Zwolle
Hydro 55.71 55.71 55.71 55.71 55.71 55.71 55.71
Wind 46.07 41.93 41.93 41.93 86.81 86.81 86.81
Nuclear 14.68 12.89 12.89 12.89 17.76 17.76 17.76
Lignite 12.55 11.03 12.55 12.55 12.55 12.55 12.55
Coal 12.55 11.03 12.55 12.55 12.55 12.55 12.55
CCGT 4.16 4.96 7.93 7.93 8.53 8.53 8.53
Natural gas 4.16 4.95 7.92 7.92 8.52 8.52 8.52
Oil-based 4.16 4.96 7.93 7.93 8.53 8.53 8.53
Table 17: Hourly fixed costs per node and technology
21Sources: IEA, Weighted Average CIF Cost of Crude Oil, IEA Annual Statistical Supple-
ment for 2005, released August, 25 2006;
www.bafa.de/1/de/service/statistiken/kraftwerkssteinkohle.php;
www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Navigation/Energie/Energiestatistiken/energiestatistiken, did =
53736.html;
EWI/Prognos Studie: Die Entwicklung der Energiemrkte bis zum Jahr 2030, p. 12.
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